godoy

FM 3-24

MCWP 3-33.5

COUNTERINSURGENCY

DECEMBER 2006

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:

Approved for public reléase; distribution is unlimited.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Foreword

This manual is designed to fll a doctrinal gap. It has been 20 years since the Army published a feld manual devoted exclusively to counterinsurgency operations. For the Marine Corps it has been 25 years. With our Soldiers and Marines fghting insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is essential that we give them a manual that provides principies and guidelines for counterinsurgency operations. Such guidance must be grounded in historical studies. However, it also must be informed by contemporary experiences.

This manual takes a general approach to counterinsurgency operations. The Army and Marine Corps recognize that every insurgency is contextual and presents its own set of challenges. You cannot fght former Saddamists and Islamic extremists the same way you would have fought the Viet Cong, Moros, or Tupamaros; the application of principies and fundamentáis to deal with each varies considerably. Nonetheless, all insurgencies, even today’s highly adaptable strains, remain wars amongst the people. They use variations of standard themes and adhere to elements of a recognizable revolutionary campaign plan. This manual therefore addresses the common characteristics of insurgencies. It strives to provide those conducting counterinsurgency campaigns with a solid foundation for understanding and addressing specifc insurgencies.

A counterinsurgency campaign is, as described in this manual, a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations conducted along múltiple lines of operations. It requires Soldiers and Marines to employ a mix of familiar combat tasks and skills more often associated with nonmilitary agencies. The balance between them depends on the local situation. Achieving this balance is not easy. It requires leaders at all levéis to adjust their approach constantly. They must ensure that their Soldiers and Marines are ready to be greeted with either a handshake or a hand grenade while taking on missions only infrequently practiced until recently at our combat training centers. Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation builders as well as warriors. They must be prepared to help reestablish institutions and local security forces and assist in rebuilding infrastructure and basic services. They must be able to facilitate establishing local governance and the rule of law. The list of such tasks is long; performing them involves extensive coordination and cooperation with many intergovernmental, host-nation, and international agencies. Indeed, the responsibilities of leaders in a counterinsurgency campaign are daunting; however, the discussions in this manual alert leaders to the challenges of such campaigns and suggest general approaches for grappling with those challenges.

Conducting a successñil counterinsurgency campaign requires a fexible, adaptive forcé led by agüe, well-informed, culturally astute leaders. It is our hope that this manual provides the guidelines needed to succeed in operations that are exceedingly diffcult and complex. Our Soldiers and Marines deserve nothing less.

DAVID H. PETRAEUS                            JAMES F. AMOS

Lieutenant General, U.S. Army                  Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Commander                                          Deputy Commandant

U.S. Army Combined Arms Center            Combat Development and Integration

FM 3-24 *MCWP 3-33.5

Field Manual No. 3-24

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5

Headquarters

Department of the Army

Washington, DC

Headquarters

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Department of the Navy

Headquarters

United States Marine Corps

Washington, DC

15 December 2006

COUNTERINSURGENCY

Contents

Page

PREFACE................................................................................................... vii

INTRODUCTION........................................................................................... ix

Chapter 1         INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY.............................................. 1-1

Overview.................................................................................................... 1-1

Aspects of Insurgency................................................................................ 1-2

Aspects of Counterinsurgency.................................................................. 1-19

Chapter 2         UNITY OF EFFORT: INTEGRATING CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ACTIVITIES 2-1

Integration.................................................................................................. 2-1

Key Counterinsurgency Participants and Their Likely Roles........................... 2-4

Key Responsibilities in Counterinsurgency................................................... 2-9

Civilian and Military Integration Mechanisms............................................... 2-10

Tactical-Level Interagency Considerations.................................................. 2-14

Chapter 3         INTELLIGENCE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY............................................... 3-1

Section I - Intelligence Characteristics in Counterinsurgency.................... 3-1

Section ll- Predeployment Planning and Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlefield.................................................................................................. 3-2

Define the Operational Environment............................................................ 3-2

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public reléase; distribution is unlimited.

*This publication supersedes FMI 3-07.22, 1 October 2004, and MCWP 3-33.5, 29 January 1980.

Marine Corps PCN: 143 000124 00

Contents

Describe the Effects of the Operational Environment.................................... 3-3

Evalúate the Threat.................................................................................... 3-12

Determine Threat Courses of Action........................................................... 3-20

Section III - Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations3-24

The Intelligence-Operations Dynamic.......................................................... 3-25

Human Intelligence and Operational Reporting............................................ 3-26

Surveillance and Reconnaissance Considerations....................................... 3-27

Considerations for Other Intelligence Disciplines......................................... 3-28

Section IV - Counterintelligence and Counterreconnaissance.................. 3-30

Section V - All-Source Intelligence........................................................... 3-30

Current Operations.................................................................................... 3-31

Comprehensive Insurgency Analysis.......................................................... 3-31

Reachback............................................................................................... 3-32

Analytic Continuity..................................................................................... 3-32

Section VI - Intelligence Collaboration..................................................... 3-33

Intelligence Cells and Working Groups....................................................... 3-33

Protecting Sources................................................................................... 3-34

Host-Nation Integration.............................................................................. 3-34

Section Vil - Summary............................................................................. 3-35

Chapter 4         DESIGNING COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS AND OPERATIONS....4-1

The Importance of Campaign Design........................................................... 4-1

The Relationship Between Design and Planning............................................ 4-2

The Nature of Design.................................................................................. 4-3

Considerations for Design........................................................................... 4-3

Design for Counterinsurgency..................................................................... 4-4

Summary.................................................................................................... 4-9

Chapter 5         EXECUTING COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS.................................. 5-1

The Nature of Counterinsurgency Operations................................................ 5-1

Logical Lines of Operations in Counterinsurgency......................................... 5-3

Counterinsurgency Approaches................................................................. 5-18

Assessment of Counterinsurgency Operations............................................ 5-26

Targeting.................................................................................................. 5-29

Learning and Adapting.............................................................................. 5-31

Summary.................................................................................................. 5-31

Chapter 6         DEVELOPING HOST-NATION SECURITY FORCES..................................... 6-1

Overview.................................................................................................... 6-1

Challenges, Resources, and End State........................................................ 6-2

Framework for Development....................................................................... 6-6

Pólice in Counterinsurgency....................................................................... 6-19

Summary.................................................................................................. 6-22

Chapter 7         LEADERSHIP AND ETHICS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY.......................... 7-1

Leadership in Counterinsurgency................................................................. 7-1

Large- and Small-Unit Leadership Tenets...................................................... 7-1

Ethics........................................................................................................ 7-5

Warfighting Versus Policing........................................................................ 7-5

Proportionality and Discrimination............................................................... 7-6